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Abstract 
 
Over the last couple of months a large number of 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have 
occurred across the world, especially targeting those 
who provide web services. IP traceback, a counter 
measure against DDoS, is the ability to trace IP 
packets back to the true source/s of the attack.  In this 
paper, an IP traceback scheme using a machine 
learning technique called Intelligent Decision 
Prototype (IDP), is proposed. IDP can be used on both 
Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) and 
Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) traceback 
schemes to identify DDoS attacks.  This will greatly 
reduce the packets that are marked and in effect make 
the system more efficient and effective at tracing the 
source of an attack compared with other methods. IDP 
can be applied to many security systems such as Data 
Mining, Forensic Analysis, Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) and DDoS defense systems.  
 
Index Terms— IP Traceback, Machine Learning, 
Decision trees, Distributed Denial of Service, 
Intelligent Decision Prototype 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Businesses over the last decade have invested 
heavily in web technologies to provide better services 
to their clients and customers. With such heavy 
investment, any form of disruptions to these services 
can cost a business not just loss of profit but also the 
high cost of repairs to fix the problems. One of the 
most deadly forms of disruption is Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS) attacks.  According to the Prolexic 
Zombie Report 2007, over 4000 DDoS attacks happen 
daily [29].  A DDoS attack is an explicit attack to 
prevent legitimate users from using their desired 
resources [4][5]. 
In a ‘general’ DDoS attack, the attacker usually 
disguises or ‘spoofs’ the IP address section of a packet 
header in order to hide their identity from their victim. 
This makes it extremely difficult to track the source of 
the attack. IP traceback [1][2] is a scheme that has been 
researched for at least ten years and provides an 
effective way to trace the source of DDoS attacks to its 
point of origin.  
In this paper, we are applying machine learning 
principals to a packet marking system that has the 
characteristics of Probability Packet Marking (PPM) 
[6] and Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) [7]. This 
machine learning mechanism, called Intelligent 
Decision Prototype (IDP), provides a more flexible and 
efficient way of marking packets compared with other 
IP traceback mechanisms, such as logging, messaging, 
PPM, DPM, Link testing and hop-counting.  
IDP works by marking only packets that have the 
“appearance” or attributes of known and unknown 
DDoS attacks. The DPM systems marks every packet, 
while PPM systems mark every 1/20000 packet.  This 
targeted marking is an advantage for IDP compared 
with other systems like DPM and PPM.  IDP 
minimises the need to modify the IP protocol, since it 
only marks selected packets identified as an attack 
packet.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 covers related work that has been covered on 
IP traceback and machine learning. In section 3, the 
details of IDP are introduced, which include system 
design and implemented. Section 4 shows how IDP 
improves the traceback mechanism. Finally, the 
challenges and conclusion are discussed. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Current IP traceback schemes can be categorized 
into two main areas, proactive and reactive [2]. 
Reactive traceback systems are responses to an 
ongoing attack, thereby must remain active during the 
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attack, otherwise they cannot react to a DDoS attack. 
This makes reactive systems, like Control flooding 
[10] and Input debugging [11], unsuitable for the 
internet but is best suited for controlled networks.  
One of the problems with reactive schemas is that 
they require ISP co-operation, which usually is not 
usually forthcoming due to a loss of competitive 
advantage.  
In contrast, proactive schemas actively record 
tracing information as packets transgress the network, 
in which the victim can reconstruct the path taken by 
the attack packets and subsequently identify the source 
of the attack. Some examples of proactive schemas 
include messaging [12][13], logging [14][15] and 
packet marking [16][17]. Intelligent Decision 
Prototype (IDP) can be used in most of these areas but 
the main focus of this paper is the packet marking area.  
 
2.1. Reactive methods 
 
Link testing methods fall into the reactive category, 
which includes input debugging [10] and controlled 
flooding methods [11]. The main idea of Link testing is 
to begin at the victim end and find where the attack 
came from upstream links. This is accomplished by 
testing all possible routes to see where the attack 
packet might have come from.   
Link testing has a number of advantages, such as, 
changes to the network infrastructure or to the internet 
protocols are kept to a minimum.  Link testing also 
keeps traffic overheads to a minimum.   
Link testing has a number of limitations. Firstly, it 
takes time and computer resources to establish a trace 
on the route taken by the attack packets. Secondly, if 
the attack packets transgress through the backbone 
network, then reconstructing the path is not possible. 
Thirdly, Link testing methods will not work unless it 
has enough attack packets to be able to trace back to 
the source. Lastly, Link testing is not suited to handle 
DDoS attacks, since DDoS incorporates multiple 
sources for the attack. Thereby, the resources and time 
that Link testing would have to invest in would be so 
high that itself could be called a denial of service 
(DoS) [2].  
 
2.2. Proactive methods 
 
The most well known proactive method for IP 
traceback is called messaging. In the paper by Bellovin 
et al., they proposed an ICMP message to find the 
source of spoofed attack packets [12].  The paper by 
Mankin et al. modified Bellovin’s work by proposing 
an intension-driven ICMP traceback [13].  These 
methods run into trouble if there is a small amount of 
attack packets embedded into the attack traffic, thereby 
rebuilding the real path from such attack traffic is 
extremely difficult. The main problem with messaging 
schemes is that ICMP packets are often dropped by 
routers since false ICMP messages could be easily 
used and implanted by attackers. 
Another proactive method for IP traceback is 
logging [14][15]. The logging method goal is to store 
traffic data for analysis at a later time. A hash-based 
logging method is one example of the logging method 
goals [24].  Baba et al. [15] proposed a system using 
tracing agents (tracers), which are deployed throughout 
the network to log attack packets and manage the 
agents. The main advantage of a logging system is that 
it can find the source of an attack based on a single 
packet. The problem with a logging system is that it 
needs large amounts of processing and storage 
requirements. This makes the logging system difficult 
to deploy on a wide scale.  
A packet marking system is the last of the proactive 
methods.  The two best known systems are 
Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) and Deterministic 
Packet Marking (DPM).  Probabilistic Packet Marking, 
proposed by Savage, et al. [6], holds the assumption 
that attacking packets are much more frequent than 
normal packets that come into the router or host. Once 
the 20,000th packet enters the router, the PPM system 
marks this packet with probabilistic information, which 
will then allow the victim to reconstruct the path to the 
packet source.  
Peng et al. [19] proposed an adjustment to the PPM 
system, in order to reduce the number of packets 
needed to reconstruct the attack path, thereby making it 
a more efficient system. Inside the packet header, PPM 
uses the fields that are rarely used within the IP header 
to mark the packets. The advantage of PPM is that it 
needs less attack traffic than an ICMP traceback 
system to be able to reconstruct the path back to the 
source, but has difficulties if multiple attacks sources 
increase.   
Unfortunately, PPM suffers from mark spoofing, 
where an attacker spoofs the source address of the 
attack packet.  This causes PPM to trace the attack to 
the wrong source [7].  PPM also reveals all the paths 
taken by the attack packets (full-path traceback 
system).  This type of information is unnecessary since 
the goal of any traceback system is to find the source 
of attack, not every path taken by the attack packet to 
reach the victim. 
Deterministic Packet Marking [7] was introduced in 
order to overcome the shortcomings of PPM. This 
method has many advantages over the other traceback 
systems, since it is simple to implement, has no 
bandwidth requirements, uses less overheads, and is 
free from false marking. The problem with DPM is in 
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order to perform a successful traceback you need 
enough packets to be collected so you can reconstruct 
the attack path [2]. 
Other proactive packet marking systems include 
Path Identifier [20], Authenticated Marking Scheme 
[21], polynomial path reconstruction and Flexible 
Deterministic Packet Marking (FDPM) [22]. 
 
2.3. Machine Learning  
 
Machine Learning is a field that is divided into a 
broad range of categories, ranging from supervised 
learning, unsupervised learning, analytical learning, 
active learning, reinforcement learning and semi-
supervised learning.  
Supervised learning involves learning functions 
from labeled data sets [23][24]. Unsupervised learning 
involves algorithms that form grouping clusters to 
learn patterns and associations with data sets that have 
no attached labels [24]. Analytical learning uses data 
sets that are not labeled, but instead have background 
knowledge [25]. Reinforcement learning uses 
algorithms to learn control polices through a 
reinforcement environment [26]. Active learning [28] 
uses unlabeled data sets that can be labeled in 
sequential process. Lastly, Semi- Supervised learning 
[25] deals with data sets that are combination of 
labeled and unlabeled examples. 
 
3. Intelligent Decision Prototype 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Intelligent Decision Prototype (IDP) is a supervised 
machine learning application that is employed into two 
parts. The first part, called Pre-Marked Decision 
(PMD), is located at the edge of the routers, like DPM. 
Figure 1 shows how the PMD is setup. The packet 
comes into the router, and is then analysed by PMD for 
attributes that make up a DDoS attack. If the traffic is 
legitimate, the packet is forwarded onto the next router 
or host. If PMD decides that the packet shows signs 
that it is not legitimate, it sends it for packet marking.  
IDP uses the Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) 
method to only mark packets it deems to be 
illegitimate. We call our packet marker the Intelligent 
Decision Prototype Marker (IDPM). This makes PMD 
a more efficient and effective packet marker than 
DPM, since it does not burden the router to mark every 
packet regardless whether the packet is legitimate or 
illegitimate.  
The second part of IDP is made up of two sections. 
One section is to deal with reconstructing the path back 
to the source of the attack, which will be discussed 
down below. The second section uses another machine 
learning method, called Reconstruct And Drop (RAD), 
to deal with the actual attack packet. 
 
3.2. Description of IDP 
 
IDP is distributed on the edge routers, as seen in 
figure 2. As the packet comes into the router, IDP will 
send the packet for analysis by the PMD, to determine 
if the packet is legitimate or illegitimate. PMD, as seen 
in figure 3, is a decision tree that looks for attributes of 
known/unknown DDoS attacks.  
Known DDoS attacks like Trinoo, TFN2K, etc. 
have certain attributes that can be tested against. 
Attackers, knowing these attributes, could attempt to 
modify these known attacks to get around the PMD. 
These new or unknown attacks are handled by PMD 
with a new technique called Alternative Decision 
Making (ADM).  
Alternative decision builds upon the assumption 
that attackers have to employ the same communication 
channels to accomplish their attacks. These channels 
can be analysed to see if any new or modified attacks 
are in progress.  
Once an attack has been identified by PMD, it is 
sent for marking.  IDP, in regard to packet marking, is 
a hybrid method of DPM, PPM and Logging methods.  
IDP incorporates a logging technique which allows 
for reconstruction of the source path using only one 
marked packet, even though many marked packets are 
sent to the victim. This is accomplished by using a 
unique ID mark for each of the edge routers that use 
IDP, as shown in figure 2.  
 
Figure 1. Example of PDM 
 
Figure 2. IDP diagram 
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Once the packet has been through PMD, it is then 
forwarded to the next router or to the victim. Once the 
packet reaches the victim, the victim can reconstruct 
the source using the unique mark placed within the 
packet to determine the source location of the received 
packet. 
 
3.3. Packet Marking 
 
The packet marking algorithm of IDPM, follows the 
packet marking algorithm of DPM. DPM uses the 16-
bit ID field and the reserved 1-bit flag. These fields are 
rarely used within the packet, so packet fragmentation 
is kept to a minimum. IDPM will mark each packet 
with its own unique ID that will remain unchanged for 
as long as the packet traverses the network.  A router in 
the defence network will have a unique ID marker that 
is made up of 8bits, such as 0000001 (refer to figure 2). 
A DDos victim will be able to identify the ingress 
router once it reconstructs the unique ID marker from a 
marked packet. The difference between IDP and DPM 
is that IDP does not mark packets deterministically, 
that is it does not mark every packet that enters the 
router. It only marks the packets that come from the 
PMD procedure. If the packet is spoofed, IDP will 
detect such spoof mark and send it to the packet 
marking procedure to include the correct mark.  
Thus, IDPM solves the problem of tracing the 
wrong path due to spoofed packets, as well as keeping 
any changes to the IP packet to a minimum since it 
only marks packets it deems to be illegitimate.  IDPM 
improves the ability to traceback since it only requires 
one packet to find the source of the attack. 
 
 
 
 
4. Performance Evaluation 
 
Simulations were conducted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the PMD section of IDP, particularly 
the IP traceback procedure to see if it could detect 
known and unknown DDoS attack packets. The second 
goal was to see if IDP could successfully be used to 
trace back the source of the DDoS attack. The 
following metrics were used for this evaluation:   
                             
 (1)
 
Where a is the average legitimate packets detected 
by PMD (n) over the total packets (m) that passed 
through the router each day of the test data. 
pb
q
=
                              
(2)
 
Where b is the average of detected attack packets by 
PMD (p) over the total attacks packets (q) that were 
introduced into the data set.  
For IDPM traceback we used the following 
calculations: 
d
c
e
=                               (3) 
Where c is equal to the average traceback success 
(d) over the total packets (e) that the victim received 
gf
h
=                              (4) 
Where f is the average false positives (g) over the 
total packets that it received.  
We also wanted to compare PMD over DPM 
performance, in which PMD only marks packets that it 
determines to be DDoS attack packets. We 
accomplished this by allowing IDP to run without 
PMD and just let IDPM mark the packets the way 
DPM does. Then we used the reconstruction data to 
check the performance against PMD.  
 
4.1. Simulation Setup 
 
To test out IDP and its traceback procedure, we 
needed a controlled group data set.  The reason for this 
is to be able to determine if PMD and its traceback 
procedure works. We got this data group from the 
week 2 data set, 1998 DARPA intrusion detection 
evaluation data set at Lincoln Laboratory, MIT [28].  
The data sets from MIT come in TCP dump format, so 
we extracted the features we needed and insert them 
into a MySQL database. These features included SrcIP, 
DestIP, SrcPort, DestPort and the length of time.  We 
added two extra fields to the table. The first field added 
was for the PMD decision (0 for legitimate, 1 for 
 
Figure 3. PDM decision tree 
n 
a 
m 
= 
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illegitimate). The second field added was to indicate 
whether the traceback procedure was successful (0 for 
success and 1 for failure). 
 
4.2. Evaluation  
 
Using the MIT data set, we set out to test to if PMD 
could detect the DDoS attack packets that we inserted 
into the data. Figure 4 show’s that PMD successfully 
detected 75-79% of the legitimate traffic in the data 
set. This means that only 21-25% of the total legitimate 
traffic was attack traffic.  PMD was able to detect 76-
81% of the attack traffic.  Figure 4 and Figure 5 results 
show that only a small number of attack traffic were 
misidentified, thereby we can conclude PMD can 
classify what is and is not attack traffic to around 75% 
accuracy. 
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Figure 4. Average legitimate traffic detected by PDM 
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Figure 5. Average attack traffic detected by PDM 
Figure 6 shows that IDPM was able to traceback 75-
80% of marked packets back to the source. As seen in 
figure 7, 75-80% of the trace backed packets are DDoS 
attack packets (true positive). 
Lastly, the comparison of IDP and DPM can be 
seen in figure 8, which shows a legitimate IP address 
(192.123.0.1).  We than ran the IDP program, in which 
PPM took about 5sec to make a decision whether the 
packet was legitimate, therefore not requiring any 
packet marking. DPM on the other hand marked the 
packet as it came in.  Figure 8 demonstrates that IDP is 
far more efficient than DPM in regard to packet 
marking. 
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Figure 7. True positives traceback by IDPM 
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Figure 8. Comparison of PDM and DPM 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
In this paper Intelligent Decision Prototype (IDP) 
was presented.  It provides a Pre-Marking Decision 
(PMD) mechanism to evaluate a packet before the 
packet is marked for traceback purposes. This makes 
IDP more efficient and effective than other packet 
marking schemas (PPM and DPM), since it can’t be 
marked spoofed like PPM and it doesn’t have to mark 
every packet that comes into the router to be able to 
traceback to the source.  We also show that IDP can 
successfully traceback 75-80% of packets from just 
one marked packet.  In the future, we will be setting up 
IDP at the Sunet Corporation ISP to begin real-time 
data gathering and testing of IDP. This will allow us to 
fine tune IDP to better detect and filter DDoS attacks. 
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